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Human evolution unfolded through a rather distinctive, dynamically constructed ecological
niche. The human niche is not only generally terrestrial in habitat, while being flexibly
and extensively heterotrophic in food-web connections. It is also defined by semiotically
structured and structuring embodied cognitive interfaces, connecting the individual
organism with the wider environment. The embodied dimensions of niche-population
co-evolution have long involved semiotic system construction, which I hypothesize to
be an evolutionarily primitive aspect of learning and higher-level cognitive integration and
attention in the great apes and humans alike. A clearly pre-linguistic form of semiotic
cognitive structuration is suggested to involve recursively learned and constructed
object icons. Higher-level cognitive iconic representation of visually, auditorily, or
haptically perceived extrasomatic objects would be learned and evoked through indexical
connections to proprioceptive and affective somatic states. Thus, private cognitive signs
would be defined, not only by their learned and perceived extrasomatic referents, but
also by their associations to iconically represented somatic states. This evolutionary
modification of animal associative learning is suggested to be adaptive in ecological
niches occupied by long-lived, large-bodied ape species, facilitating memory construction
and recall in highly varied foraging and social contexts, while sustaining selective
attention during goal-directed behavioral sequences. The embodied niche construction
(ENC) hypothesis of human evolution posits that in the early hominin lineage, natural
selection further modified the ancestral ape semiotic adaptations, favoring the recursive
structuration of concise iconic narratives of embodied interaction with the environment.
Keywords: embodied cognition, niche construction, hominin adaptation, co-evolution, iconic narrative, semiotics,
bipedalism
INTRODUCTION
Concepts of embodied cognition have been intensively developed
and extensively treated in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive sci-
ence, and the philosophy of cognition over the past 30 years
(Humphrey, 1992; Clark, 1993, 1998, 2008; Damasio, 2003, 2008;
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Rowlands, 2006; Dove, 2011). Although
popular accounts have reached scholarly specialists in human
evolution (e.g., Coward and Gamble, 2008), embodied cognition
seems to be in its conceptual and theoretical infancy in paleoan-
thropology. Barton’s phylogenetic comparative work—focusing
on the neuroanatomical support for sensory-motor simulation in
the primate order—stands out as a promising exception (Barton,
2012). Paleoanthropology’s engagement with embodied cogni-
tion research could provide a needed comparative evolutionary
perspective on what is unique about how the human body and
body-environment interaction shape, facilitate, or constrain cog-
nition.
Such an evolutionary approach highlights some fundamen-
tal questions. What aspects of embodied cognition might be
relatively evolutionarily primitive among terrestrial vertebrates?
What aspects might be relatively derived among the (phyloge-
netically nested) primate, anthropoid, ape, and hominin lin-
eages, respectively (Figure 1)? I suggest that recent theoretical
developments in paleoanthropology, evolutionary biology, and
ecology are especially amenable to—and would be scientifically
strengthened by—embodied cognition research. Consideration of
evolutionary niche construction dynamics (Odling-Smee et al.,
2003), in particular, draws our attention to an emerging theo-
retical intersection, where we can explore how unique human
phenotypes—including linguistic communication and symbolic
representation—may have co-evolved with a niche significantly
constituted by embodied interfaces (1) between the somatic and
extrasomatic environments and (2) within the somatic environ-
ment itself. The embodied niche construction (ENC) hypothesis
aims to complement but achieve more comprehensive explana-
tion of language and sociality than recent proposals in pale-
oanthropology and linguistics (Deacon, 1998; Jackendoff, 1999;
Dunbar, 2003, 2009; Tomasello, 2008). The ENC hypothesis
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FIGURE 1 | Phylogenetic relationships among extant anthropoid
primate lineages, including Old World monkeys, apes, and
humans. Evolutionarily derived features hypothesized to distinguish
embodied niche construction in the nested great ape-hominin and
hominin-only clades, respectively, are highlighted in the text boxes
lower right.
states that human capacities for symbolic mental representation,
symbolic communication, and social cooperation emerged over
the past ca. 5–7 million years through dynamic co-evolution
with embodied cognition and environmental interaction. This
occurred within a rather distinctive, very dynamically evolv-
ing ecological niche: one that is not only generally terrestrial
in habitat—while being flexibly and extensively heterotrophic
in food-web connections—but also defined by semiotic, struc-
tured and structuring embodied interfaces between the individual
organism and the extrasomatic environment.
BACKGROUND: TOWARD INTERDISCIPLINARY COMMON
GROUND
This hypothesis article aims—perhaps naively—to prevail over
potential interdisciplinary misunderstanding. I am a biocultural
anthropologist (cf. Stutz, 2012) presenting a theoretical specu-
lation about human cognition—and to a specialized cognitive
science readership, at that. On the one hand, this is certainly like
the student trying to lecture the teacher. On the other hand, it
is precisely because I am aware of the importance of cognitive
science for studying the embodied dimensions of human expe-
rience, awareness, memory, and behavior that I would like
to highlight potential areas of common ground. Here, I can
make a strong argument that anthropology would benefit from
recent theory and research in cognitive science and experimental
psychology.
I would further suggest that—for the purpose of inter-
disciplinary bridge-building (or rebuilding, following mid-late
Twentieth Century trends of academic disciplinary proliferation
and divergence)—it is worth mapping important anthropological
and linguistic terminology and concepts onto relevant psycholog-
ical and cognitive science ones. For example, in cultural anthro-
pological theory experience and action are widely understood
as interrelated, practical, semiotically structured and structur-
ing processes (Sahlins, 2000; Geertz, 2001; Ortner, 2006). There
is potentially rich common ground with embodied cognition
research, particularly surrounding continuous embodied inter-
action as a recursive, structured and structuring process that
encompasses perception, complex associative learning, episodic
memory, simulation and representation.
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As with sociological and anthropological theories of practice—
where action is always simultaneously symbolically and mate-
rially structured and structuring (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens,
1984; Ortner, 1984)—embodied cognition and continuous envi-
ronmental interaction is a phenomenon that challenges more
than the problematic theoretical distinctions between mind
and body. It also blurs distinctions between representation and
hierarchically organized, cybernetically regulated action sequences
(Rowlands, 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2007). I would further empha-
size that embodied cognition breaks down the apparent boundary
between inter-individual social communication, on the one hand,
and intra-individual, hierarchically structured feedback through
the entire nervous system, on the other. In fact, it is here that
anthropological concepts point toward effectively augmenting
recent embodied cognition theories of human language (Clark,
2008; Dove, 2011, 2012). And it is here that anthropology can
help cognitive science tackle a key question: if embodied symbol
concepts tend to be learned through multimodal sensory-motor
experience and remain grounded through evoked sensory-motor
simulation, how are abstract concepts successfully constructed
and understood (Dove, 2011)?
With a distinctively anthropological point of departure, the
ENC hypothesis can further, more comprehensively guide cogni-
tive science research out of the laboratory, into the wide-open,
culturally structured and structuring wild of human cogni-
tion (cf. Hutchins, 1996). As Figure 2 schematically illustrates,
hominin ENC is proposed to involve non-nested hierarchical sys-
tem feedbacks from individual, temporally continuous embodied
cognition and interaction (lower left) to a metapopulation con-
stituting a cultural environment with elements persisting over
millennial timescales (e.g., language structures, technological tra-
ditions, and culturally modified landscapes). Ritualized (and rit-
ualizing) cultural environments pervasively structure embodied
experience and action. Examples are widely ethnographically and
even archaeologically documented. Consider, for instance, how
diverse communities handle death’s dual crisis—involving both
social loss and the emergence of an abject cadaver (Nilsson Stutz,
2003). The cross-cultural diversity in—and patterns of long-term
prehistoric and historic change through—mortuary ritual dra-
matically highlights how human societies construct and practi-
callymanage life passages or crises (Nilsson Stutz, 2003). Everyday
ritualized handling of embodied experience can also be power-
fully transformative, including social interpretation of individual
dream experiences—and representations of those experiences
(Kracke, 2007). Such qualitative and cross-cultural comparative
data support explaining how embodied perceptual representa-
tions and concepts could shape and sustain what Dove (2011)
has called “dis-embodied” abstract concepts, which emerge from
embodied interaction and experience. Abstract but socially useful
concepts like being, death, hierarchy, identity, comparison, duty,
purity, pollution, and sacred do tend to getmaterially grounded in
embodied social techniques—through dramatic rituals, detailed
myths, and production and interaction with artistic objects (Gell,
1998; Nilsson Stutz, 2003). At the same time, these very prac-
tices also produce unimaginably rich material for cognitively
constructing associations (cf. Clark, 2008; Heyes, 2010a,b, 2012).
In general, the systemic feedbacks among individual mem-
ory construction, associative learning, mental planning and social
decision-making, on the one hand, and prevailing cultural envi-
ronments, on the other, combine to shape and constrain how
FIGURE 2 | Logarithmic plot of the general population-time-scale structure of embodied cognition and niche construction in human biocultural
evolution.
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individuals cognize abstract concepts over time, dynamically
associating them to the concrete (cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1962a). Still,
the embodied cultural environment would seem to be over-
whelmingly rich in potentially evocative associations. Thus, the
embodied cultural environment would seemingly hinder the indi-
vidual from sustaining her attention on any one given coherent
embodied system of associated extrasomatic environmental stim-
uli, perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and remembered
experiences. With a prohibitively intricate range of possible,
imaginable symbolic boundaries or associative relationships, how
is it that we can even construct memory, make behavioral deci-
sions, or achieve enduring attitudes or opinions? This considera-
tion suggests framing the key question another way. If apparently
abstract concepts are actually emergent features of complex sys-
tems of embodied association production (cf. Clark, 2008), how
do such concepts remain robustly connected to a stable asso-
ciation structure? In thought and action, we regularly succeed
in making such practical but effectively aesthetic choices (Gell,
1998; Agamben, 1999). I emphasize that theories of embodied
cognition—considered from an anthropological perspective—
suggest the following prediction. The emotional, proprioceptive,
and interoceptive experiences that result from successfully con-
structing or reconstructing socially salient associations between
present and past, general and specific, other and self, known and
unknown themselves constitute an embodied, unconscious heroic
narrative representation of self successfully constructing a coherent,
durable aspect of the world.
In the remainder of this essay I hope to convince the reader
that the ENC hypothesis focuses our own scholarly joint attention
on embodied narratives—that is, not simply embodied cognitive
simulations, but temporally-compressed, emotionally evocative
representations of remembered or imagined events and experi-
ences that would occur over longer time periods, often involving
acquisition of durable, even timeless dispositions. Moreover, I
hope to make the case that embodied narratives are complex
because they are simultaneously adaptive phenotypes and part of
our dynamically evolving niche. In this context, embodied narra-
tives have been gradually transformed in the hominin (human)
lineage, from private iconic constructions to socially shared,
recursively elaborated and endlessly mashed up forms.
EMBODIED NICHE CONSTRUCTION: SEMIOTICALLY
STRUCTURED AND STRUCTURING COGNITIVE INTERFACES
WITH THE ENVIRONMENT
When Dawkins described the “long reach of the gene” as its
extended phenotype, he argued that DNA replicators drive eco-
logical processes at multiple scales, from intra- to intercellular
and from somatic to extrasomatic levels (Dawkins, 1982). The
extended-phenotype concept was rhetorically compelling. It was
also a heuristic corrective within the history of thought in evo-
lutionary biology. Dawkins argued against overemphasizing or
reifying the organism and environment—or even the nature of
continuous intergenerational evolutionary change as constantly
gradual. Yet, this replicator-centered perspective is just as theoret-
ically insufficient for explaining biological evolution as are strictly
organism, population, or ecosystem-centered views. Recent work
on dynamic niche construction processes (Odling-Smee et al.,
2003) andmulti-scalar complex ecological processes (Levin, 1992;
Gunderson and Holling, 2001; Schneider, 2010) makes clear that
biological systems characteristically exhibit resilient structures or
equilibrium states at more than one scale, but change at a given
scale or structure can have important dynamic feedback effects
stretching beyond the local environment. Genetic variation in
replicators may drive evolutionary competition and selection,
but this is a relatively local ecological complex-systems process.
Evolution involves dynamic feedbacks among replicator popula-
tions; their non-nested, hierarchically structured extended phe-
notypes; and their similarly non-nested hierarchically structured
niches (Allen and Starr, 1982).
Moreover, there are multiple scales within and around the
organism in which phenotypes have a dual systemic role.
Phenotypes are not just subject to natural selection for fit to
the prevailing environment. They are often also the very envi-
ronments that influence their own fitness (Odling-Smee et al.,
2003). In animals ENC occurs because the chordate body is inter-
connected with the world through complex thresholds, which
constitute an integral part of the animal’s niche, even as the body
is also adaptation to that niche.
It is especially relevant, then, that embodied cognition research
emphasizes the dynamic multiscale, often parallel-channel pro-
cess of an organism’s interaction with the environment (Clark,
1998, 2008; Damasio, 2000, 2003; Rowlands, 2006; Pfeifer et al.,
2007). In fact, embodied cognition and environmental interac-
tion may be understood as thoroughly intertwined, multidimen-
sional and hierarchically structured processes in which:
• the bodily surface and the sensory organs constitute a complex,
interactive threshold between the organism and surrounding
environment—in which foraging, predation avoidance, rest-
ing, courtship and mating, and other social behaviors unfold;
and
• the brain continuously interacts with:
➢ the rest of the body—via homeostatic systems that reg-
ulate circulatory, metabolic/digestive, motor activity, bod-
ily balance, immune/inflammation, endocrine, reproductive
system, and alertness states; and
➢ the extrasomatic environment—via sensory organs during
joint cognition/bodily action processes; and
➢ the subsystems within the brain itself—via:
– connections amongmodality-specific perception systems;
– connections between perceptual representation systems
and more specific homeostatic systems, giving rise to feel-
ings and awareness [e.g., metabolic and digestive informa-
tion increasing alertness, generating an embodied feeling
of hunger (cf. Damasio, 2003)]; and
– simulation (Barsalou, 1999, 2009), memory construc-
tion, and other higher-order mental processes that use
learned, iconic and indexical neural representations of
embodied cognitive/interactive states (cf. Deacon, 1998:
Chapter 3), which in turn can affect sustained mental or
bodily attention on a cognized object.
With the exception of the simulation and memory construction
component, this sketch of embodied cognition/interaction may
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generally model behavioral processes in vertebrates and most
invertebrates. That last component itself—capacity for simulation
and learned iconic and indexical embodied representation—does
encompass a range of phenotypes found across the vertebrates.
In turn, this comparative zoological scope suggests that what
Clark (2008:p. 42) has described as “profound” and “promiscu-
ous” embodied engagement with the world is evolutionary quite
ancient in the animal kingdom and widespread, especially in
the terrestrial biosphere. Finally, as Deacon’s (1998: Chapter 3)
symbolic-threshold model suggests, the higher-order cognitive
capacity to recursively and indexically link symbols, symbols
and iconic representations, and deictic symbol-index concatena-
tions could have gradually evolved in the hominin lineage (see
Figure 1), with hierarchical complexity increasing over 100’s of
thousands of years, so that open-ended systems of symbolic rep-
resentation incrementally pervaded the environments in which
embodied interaction occurred.
It is worth pointing out that, here, Chomsky and col-
leagues’ recent general emphasis on symbolic recursion in
language (Hauser et al., 2002, 2014) may be seen—at least
potentially—as theoretically converging toward Deacon’s model,
opening the way to a synthetic foundation for investigating
the evolution of language as part of a much longer, grad-
ual dynamic, in which embodied cognition and interaction has
resulted from a very deep co-evolutionary process. Embodied
cognition/environmental interaction has resulted from diversi-
fying niche construction and phenotypic adaptation—via nat-
ural selection—across the animal kingdom. I thus suggest that
it is particularly important to investigate how embodied cog-
nition/environmental interaction dynamically evolved in the
hominins as both niche and phenotype.
HIGHER-LEVEL COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION IN EMBODIED
COGNITIVE CONTEXT
Adaptive interfaces in most vertebrate animal niches constitute—
and are constituted by—two non-nested hierarchically structured
levels of embodied attention to the immediate surround-
ings. First, distributed embodied cognitive management of
environmental interaction can be monitored and managed
through higher-level neural connections in the brain—or even
by the relatively distal spinal cord. In either case, envi-
ronmental interaction effectively proceeds with little central-
ized higher cognitive interpretation and direction of bodily
activity. This allows grasping, gross limb movements, man-
agement of torso posture, head movements, chewing, and
dynamic gazing/visual scanning to occur efficiently, with-
out constantly raising overall bodily alertness levels—and
without overwhelming higher cognitive decision-making sys-
tems for determining the present focus of selective atten-
tion. Second, higher cognitive processes can take place at
the same time as the substantially decentralized orchestration
of behavior operates. Higher constructive cognitive processes
would be able to manage modal and cross-modal learning
and perception of relevant environmental objects, deixis with
respect to those objects, memory construction, and—perhaps
most importantly—tactical decision-making about changing
short-term equilibrium goals.
In evolutionary perspective, this dual-level model of embodied
cognition can aid our theorizing about vertebrate animal behav-
ior. For example, it supports our hypothesizing about behaviors
of common vertebrate species that thrive in habitats shared with
humans. For example, I can reasonably speculate that embod-
ied squirrel (genus Sciurus) cognition facilitates sustained manual
grasping and rhythmic mastication of a food object, reducing
embodied attention on the actual handling and eating behav-
iors, and thus opening the animal’s sensory focus on potential
predators, possible mates, and territorial challenges from other
squirrels. In general, we may expect that embodied dimensions
of cognition have been important in animal evolution, because
they may minimize the opportunity costs of selective attention on
one fitness determinant—for example, foraging—at the expense
of others—including predation risk, conspecific territorial chal-
lenges, or courtship and mating.
SEMIOTIC SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION IN EMBODIED COGNITIVE
CONTEXT
The dual-level structure of embodied cognition helps us to
investigate the evolution of semiotic construction capacities—
initially not for structuring social signaling, but for structuring
individual learning, perception, and reasoning. Here, it comes
into very sharp focus that “semiotic as logic” is sufficient for
learning and memory construction—that is, the cognitive fil-
tering, storage, and recall of relevant information in the ani-
mal’s ecological context. This is the case, even in the absence
of adaptations for complex social communication. Evolutionary
primitive cognitive construction of embodied icons and indices
is arguably widespread in the mammalian and avian classes.
Here, I use Peirce’s terminology of signs, following Deacon (1998:
Chapter 3), emphasizing that perceived or otherwise cognitively
evoked icons—as arbitrarily simplified representations of a more
complex object—may be dynamically constructed over recur-
rent embodied interactions with the extrasomatic environment.
Moreover, building on the semiotic framework presented in Gell
(1998), Peirce’s definition of index implies that iconic repre-
sentations also have indexical properties, intrinsically evoking
embodied, remembered objects, including other iconic represen-
tations. Peirce (2012: Kindle location, 2018) stated, “An Index
is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue
of being really affected by that Object.” The embodied—albeit
higher, integrative—cognitive process of icon construction must
involve indexical links to perceived objects, which are also deic-
tically, indexically linked to bodily affective states. Thus, icons
and their indexical connections form a learned, structured cog-
nitive filter. This functions to convert highly complicated, often
noisy extrasomatic and somatic stimuli into consistent, com-
prehensible body-environment interaction channels. The animal,
then, learns to engage in bouts of behavioral activity involv-
ing habitual, substantially decentralized embodied cognition and
interaction with the environment. At the same time, higher cog-
nitive functions tune attention toward the recurrent abstraction
of visual, auditory, or fine, focused haptic perceptions and mem-
ories. The resulting pre-linguistic semiotic constructions would
thus be mental, private icons of more detailed perceptions or sim-
ulations. These could include both static imagery and narrative
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memory. Moreover, these icons would have a secondary semi-
otic function, indexically evoking proprioceptive, interoceptive,
and tactile sensations and emotional states, metonymically tied
to an iconic representation through prior experience and mem-
ory construction. Most basically, I suggest that the evolution
of higher cognitive recursive functions that can abstract rich
embodied experience and memory into iconic representations
likely built on the embodied indexical connection between the
following—also dual-level—system of cognition, with the sec-
ond level further involving embodied indexical links among three
particular aspects of cognition:
• visually, auditorily, or haptically mediated construction of
extrasomatic objects as alienated from the body
• somatosensory states that affectively represent the condition of




Extending arguments presented in Rowlands (2006), I suggest
that—within the context of dynamic experience that struc-
tures and is structured by icon-index semiotic systems—we can
consider somatic states that are indexically evoked by visually,
auditorily, or haptically shaped extrasomatic icons as embodied
icons. Semiotic, structural linguistic, and anthropological theo-
ries of representation have long emphasized that signs are defined
not only by the conventionally or logically defined relationship
between signifier and signified. They are also defined by their
formal relationships to other signs (Jakobson and Halle, 1956;
Hockett, 1961; Lévi-Strauss, 1962a,b; Leach, 1976; Saussure, 2011;
Peirce, 2012). Following Deacon (1998: Chapter 3), I suggest that
the cognitive ability to learn and construct indexical relation-
ships among iconic representations of extrasomatic objects and
embodied icons evolved gradually, supporting the recursive con-
struction of concise iconic narrative representations (Figure 3).
This would have set the stage for later hominin social manip-
ulation of indexical connections to extrasomatic icons, through
gesture and gaze-following (Tomasello, 2008).
In general, the semiotic structuration of embodied cognition
is important when partially decentralized cognition and action
affords the animal’s short-term homeostatic behavior pattern in
the extrasomatic environment (Gibson, 1979), freeing up atten-
tion toward receiving and decoding information that might imply
the relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995) of altering behav-
ioral and affective homeostatic targets. I speculate that what
may have become relatively evolutionarily derived in humans—
already early in the divergence of the hominin lineage from
that of the panins (see Figure 1)—was the cognitive capacity to
construct iconic narratives, in which dramatically changing affec-
tive states are temporally contextualized in a representation of a
problem (e.g., hunger during the search for food) and its reso-
lution (satiation during feeding). Such iconic narratives should
be considered as an emergent part of the embodied interface
with the environment, helping the animal to sustain attention
on a difficult-to-obtain goal (dragging a stone anvil to the base
of a nut tree) or a social dilemma (accepting or rejecting a
solicitation to engage in a social coalition). Thus, the recursive
nature of constructing icon-index complexes is hypothesized to
be an important evolutionary inheritance in hominins, subse-
quently modified by natural selection to support human symbolic
thought and—eventually—communication.
FIGURE 3 | Hierarchically constructed object icons and iconic
narratives—indexically linked to embodied affective states and
perceived objects in the extrasomatic environment—via
body-environment thresholds. Object icons are sufficiently formed through
dynamic, recursive learning. Construction of indexical relationships among
icons emerges through embodied interaction with the extrasomatic
environment. Iconic narratives are constituted by the indexical relationships
among object icons and changes in embodied affective, proprioceptive, and
interoceptive states. It is hypothesized that one of the most evolutionarily
primitive iconic narrative genres—likely evolved in the hominin-great ape
common ancestor—is that of heroically succeeding or tragically failing to
construct an enduring aspect of the world.
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The ENC hypothesis entails that evolution modified the
ape “dual-level system” of embodied cognition (see above) in
hominin prehistory. Partially decentralized management of loco-
motion, repetitive tool-making and tool-use gestures, grasping
and carrying, and feeding—involving rhythmic or recurrent
actions or sustained isometric postures—could be maintained
over minutes or hours, while higher cognitive learning, construc-
tion, and perception could simultaneously support:
• introspective attention on semiotic signs, their objects, and
evoked relationships to other signs
• monitoring of others
• communication, involving solicitation and engagement in
bouts of joint attention
I speculate, then, that in early hominins, semiotic representation
likely co-evolved with social monitoring and solicitation and sus-
tained engagement in joint attention and interaction, prior to the
evolution of spoken language.
OVERVIEW OF EMBODIED NARRATIVES IN HOMININ NICHE
CONSTRUCTION
It is an embodied cognition perspective that makes this possibil-
ity apparent. Self ’s frequent attention on participation in socially
intense networks may be punctuated by highly focused, goal-
oriented social interactions, technological engagement with the
material environment, and ritualized motion sequences. All of
these involve reduced alertness, temporarily shutting off embod-
ied interfaces with the wider environment. Thus, managing a
marriage alliance, butchering an animal, shaping a wooden dig-
ging stick, making a flint hand-axe, or building a hut may involve
intense, narrowly selective embodied attention on a multi-step
technological process or social interaction, resulting in a mate-
rial product or negotiated relationship-state. The higher cognitive
processes involved in such activities are particularly important
for rapid niche construction. The ability to construct abstract,
iconic representations from concrete visual, auditory, and haptic
perception is an embodied behavioral adaptation. However, the
representations themselves—along with their semiotic, indexi-
cally ormetaphorically evoked connections to other learned signs,
perceived objects and events, memories, and embodied mental
simulations—become part of the niche, constituting a dynamic
part of the interface between the body and the extrasomatic
environment (cf. Clark, 2008; Dove, 2011).
The hominin embodied niche is hypothesized to have evolved
to encompass a set of dual-level cognitive interfaces with the
extrasomatic environment, where rhythmic or sustained static
behavior patterns unfold in parallel with complex systems of
indexically linked icons, facilitating social observation, action,
judgment, and self-awareness. The evolution of bipedal locomo-
tion in the hominin lineage illustrates the complex process of
“semiotically constituted and constituting ENC,” examined in the
following section.
A CASE STUDY: BIPEDAL LOCOMOTION AS EMBODIED
PHENOTYPE AND NICHE COMPONENT
Vertebrate locomotion involves a joint cognitive-behavioral sys-
tem facilitating the animal’s movement through its physical
habitat. In general, locomotion itself may be seen as an embodied
cognition system, in which control of locomotion is partially—
but significantly—decentralized across the central nervous sys-
tem, peripheral sensory-motor subsystems, and musculo-skeletal
subsystems. Central cognitive processing of sensory and other
inputs from bodily homeostatic systems is usually minimized,
first, through local oscillatory feedback in the limbs, and then
through central nervous system management of small homeo-
static neuromotor adjustments (Van de Crommert et al., 1998;
Dietz, 2003, 2010; Ijspeert, 2008). Finally, the central nervous sys-
tem supports monitoring a simple series of embodied indices of
homeostatic exertion and equilibrium levels of bodily momen-
tum in the immediate extrasomatic environment. These indica-
tors mainly involve the sense of bodily balance, and departures
from homeostatic ranges can trigger a cascading increase in
local sensory-motor and overall central nervous system alertness,
in order to respond to a sudden change in the body’s inter-
action trajectory with the surrounding milieu. We can usually
walk—or birds fly—without higher-order cognitive information-
processing and decision-making about every heel strike or big-toe
push-off—or wing flap. Thus, we can walk, chew gum, play
air drums to an imagined tune—and seagulls can scan visually
for other members of their flock, prey, and predators—while
embodied, distributed cognition takes care of locomotion.
The embodied cognitive niche dimensions of bipedal loco-
motion are strongly shaped by the fact that, in terms of energy
expenditure by the supporting musculo-skeletal and thermoreg-
ulatory systems, hominin two-legged walking or jogging uses
caloric resources at a substantially lower rate than does great ape
quadrupedal walking or running at the same pace (Leonard and
Robertson, 1997; Sockol et al., 2007). Efficient, largely decentral-
ized cognitive management of bipedal locomotion synergistically
reinforces the biomechanical, energy-saving advantage of bipedal
stride or jogging gait in a terrestrial open habitat. While under-
taking long—and long-distance—bouts of bipedal locomotion,
distributed cognitive management frees up other embodied cog-
nitive systems for visual, auditory, and olfactory perception,
semiotic construction, planning, sustained goal-oriented selective
attention, and active communication (cf. Langdon, 2005).
THE EMBODIED BIPEDAL TERRESTRIAL NICHE: REDUCED SOCIAL
ALERTNESS DURING FORAGING
Hominin locomotion adaptations emerged from ca. 7–5 million
years ago (mya) onward. Their evolution initially co-occurred
with the phylogenetic divergence of our lineage from that of
chimpanzees and bonobos (Won, 2004; Lovejoy, 2009; Lovejoy
et al., 2009; Webster, 2009; Yamamichi et al., 2011). In early
hominin populations directional selection modified the ances-
tral ape pattern of quadrupedal walking and vertical climb-
ing (Sockol et al., 2007). Here, the evolutionary process would
have favored locomotor phenotypes that were not only gener-
ally fit to the mosaic forest-grassland habitat features of East
and northern Central Africa, but also minimized energy expen-
diture in that habitat (Wheeler, 1991a,b; Leonard and Robertson,
1997). The emergence of the genus Australopithecus, ca. 4
mya in East Africa, appears to have coincided with the evolu-
tion of “obligate bipedalism,” in which the anatomy support-
ing efficient stride is so specialized that it substantially limits
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habitual arboreal climbing (Jungers, 1982; Latimer et al., 1987;
Latimer and Lovejoy, 1990; Ohman et al., 1997; Haile-Selassie
et al., 2010). Obligate bipedalism—involving an arched foot,
non-opposable big toe, and a strongly disto-medially angled
femur—is first documented among fossil traces of Au. ana-
mensis (ca. 4.2–3.9mya) and Au. afarensis (ca. 3.7–3.0mya) in
East Africa. In modern humans obligate bipedalism adapts our
bodies highly efficiently to moving around, slowly but surely,
in a terrestrial diurnal habitat, during continuous trips that
may last hours and cover as much distance as the diame-
ter of some wild chimpanzees’ and gorillas’ lifetime territories
(ca. 30–50 km). Although australopithecines exhibited a range
of vertical climbing and pedal locomotor grasping anatomy
(DeSilva et al., 2013), skeletal support for bipedal locomo-
tion in Au. afarensis (a fossil species most famously repre-
sented by the partial skeleton “Lucy,” specimen AL-288-1) had
already evolved as an integrated adaptive system between ca.
4–3mya, well fit to terrestrial activity (Haile-Selassie et al.,
2010).
As such, early obligate bipedalism was a phenotype shaped by
natural selection in a long-term process of niche-population co-
evolution. Yet, as a niche component—that is, as an embodied
interface with a terrestrial, relatively open habitat that housed
a very diverse, heterotrophic food resource spectrum—obligate
bipedal locomotion entailed new selective pressures. First, obli-
gate bipedalism exposed early hominins to a range of large
felid predators (Hart and Sussman, 2011). As a phenotype in
a foodweb heavy with large carnivores, bipedal sprinting is no
match for well-adapted quadrupedal running over short dis-
tances (Leonard and Robertson, 1997). It may be inferred—
based on theoretical models and comparative data (Sussman
et al., 2005; Hart and Sussman, 2011)—that during this crit-
ical period of niche-population co-evolution, natural selection
would have favored pro-social behaviors for aggregation. Being
part of a group not only enriches the individual’s perceptual
information about predatory threats, via indexical predator alert
calls (Seyfarth et al., 1980; Zuberbühler, 2001; Stephan and
Zuberbühler, 2008). It also simply reduces the likelihood that
a given individual will be the one ambushed and captured by
a lion or sabretooth cat hiding in the tall grass (cf. Hamilton,
1971). The bipedal embodied niche initially involved, at the very
least, frequent bouts of reduced social attentiveness, coupled
with increased alertness for indications of diverse predators—
and of prey. Yet, when terrestrial foraging was successful, the
immediate extrasomatic environment would have changed dra-
matically. If the discovered food resource was rich enough—
whether it consisted of larger game or of carbohydrate-dense
or fatty plant tissues—cooperatively transporting and defending
that food resource would have tended to increase the group-
members’ average inclusive fitness. Here, distributed cognitive
management of locomotion would have been especially impor-
tant. Individuals would have had to carry bulky or heavy food
packages, while suppressing attention to strong emotional-desire
responses to hunger sensations, with heightened, rapidly shifting
attention on immediate groupmembers, predator risks, and near-
term future possibility for satiating hunger in a safer aggregation
locality.
THE EMBODIED BIPEDAL TERRESTRIAL NICHE: COOPERATIVE
OFFSPRING CARE AND INTERTWINED NARRATIVIZED SOCIAL
IDENTITIES
Obligate bipedalism—as an embodied niche interface system—
thus conspicuously supported pro-social adaptations that went
beyond simple gregariousness. In fact, there were profound social
implications for hominin bipedal locomotion in a terrestrial, het-
erotrophic niche. Other things being equal, bipedal anatomy is
not only relatively maladaptive for escaping large quadrupedal
carnivores. For the adult female, it may be considered an evolu-
tionary compromise—in comparative primate evolutionary eco-
logical perspective—for giving birth (Tague and Lovejoy, 1986;
DeSilva, 2011; Kurki, 2011, 2013; Wells et al., 2012) and carry-
ing relatively helpless infants (Wall-Scheffler, 2012), while also
supporting long bouts of bipedal walking. Pelvic morphology
well suited for lowering the body’s center of gravity and reduc-
ing mechanical effort (and short-term metabolic balance and
long-term stress on muscles, bones, and associated connective
tissues) during upright walking exhibits a limited pelvic aper-
ture (Lovejoy, 1988; Rosenberg and Trevathan, 1995). Natural
selection has shaped this functional anatomical compromise in
the adult female hominin body, achieving efficient bipedal stride
at the expense of more frequent, riskier obstetric complications
giving birth to large-brained neonates. Given the evolution-
ary success of this compromise—measured in terms of extant
human geographic range and biomass—it is clear that the typi-
cal population-level survival and reproductive success benefits of
bipedal locomotion have more than made up for any morbidity
and mortality risks associated with parturition through a bipedal
pelvis.
The realized reproductive success associated in integral part
with bipedalism is all the more remarkable, because the pos-
ture requires adults to use their arms to carry infants and young
juveniles, raising the adult’s center of gravity during locomotion.
This imposes a relatively greater metabolic and stress cost in car-
ing for very young offspring who are still developing sufficient
fine and gross motor strength and coordination. Without a com-
pensating phenotype, the “carrying cost” would increase risk of
predation for mother and infant, alike. It would also reduce her
foraging efficiency, slowing down food search rates, while burning
more calories to search for food. The resulting metabolic deficit
would also increase mortality risks for a lactating mother and
her offspring. Virtually the only theoretically plausible behavioral
phenotypic compensation that would have co-evolved with the
bipedal embodied niche is alloparenting: cooperative offspring
care.
Indirect, circumstantial evidence for alloparenting primar-
ily consists of data on the metabolic costs and ecological risks
otherwise imposed by carrying infants and young juveniles dur-
ing bipedal locomotion. Further evidence comes from estimates
of adult maternal and neonate body mass1 . Figure 4 depicts
1Maternal body mass may be estimated, even from fragmentary weight-
bearing bones (especially the pelvis, femur, and tibia), based on extant
human and ape population correlations between skeletal element morphol-
ogy/allometric scaling and adult body mass (McHenry, 1992; Ruff, 2010;
DeSilva, 2011). Neonate body mass estimates may be independently derived
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FIGURE 4 | Evolutionary change in maternal and neonate body mass
in the hominin lineage, compared with extant chimpanzees. Maternal
body mass averages measured from fossil and modern samples shown as
squares. Neonate body mass averages measured from fossil and modern
samples shown as circles. Ardipithecus ramidus shown in orange.
Australopithecus and Homo samples shown in green, except for
Neanderthals, shown in red. The Neanderthal female and neonate fossil
samples raise the possibility that this late Pleistocene (ca. 200-40
thousand year old) western Eurasian population may have evolved a higher
body-mass:brain ratio, compared to contemporaneous regional human
populations (VanSickle, 2009; DeSilva, 2011). The Neanderthal neonate
body mass estimate is thus shown as a conservatively estimated range.
Modern chimpanzees mothers and neonates are shown in purple. Modern
and fossil maternal body mass measurements and estimates are from
VanSickle (2009) and DeSilva (2011), and neonate body mass estimates are
calculated after the methods in DeSilva and Lesnik (2008).
variation in maternal and neonate biomass in hominin sam-
ples distributed across the last 4.4 million years of our lineage’s
evolution, mainly based on data from DeSilva (2011). The sam-
ples begin with Ardipithecus ramidus, fossil specimens of which
document a hominin population lineage that had retained the
ancestral anthropoid opposable big toe, along with other anatom-
ical indicators of “non-obligate” bipedal locomotion and vertical
climbing adaptations in a forested East African habitat (Lovejoy,
2009). In comparison, the later hominin samples from 4.0 to
2.0mya include extinct or ancestral australopithecine species,
whose fossil remains document early obligate bipedal adapta-
tions. As DeSilva (2011) has emphasized, a substantial evolu-
tionary reduction in adult female body mass occurred from
Ardipithecus to Australopithecus. That such a shift occurred early
in hominin evolution was not apparent prior to publication of
the description of A. ramidus post-cranial anatomy (Lovejoy,
2009; Lovejoy et al., 2009). A. ramidus females (represented
by the remarkably intact adult female individual “Ardi,” whose
estimated body mass is represented in Figure 4 by the orange
square) had an adult size comparable to the typical level in liv-
ing chimpanzees (ca. 50 kg, also shown in Figure 4, represented
from endocranial volume measurements, elegantly based on constant anthro-
poid proportions between maternal and neonate brain mass, coupled with
great ape and human constant proportions between brain and body mass
(DeSilva and Lesnik, 2008; DeSilva, 2011; Tu˚ma and Bru˚žek, 2013).
by a purple square). Later, australopithecines and early mem-
bers of the genus Homo inherited modified, reduced female body
mass, with adults weighing only 30–40 kg. Yet, small adult female
body size was linked to a substantial jump in encephalization,
because head-size was as large or larger than that seen in apes
and ardipithecines. Australopithecine and earliest Homo adult
endocranial volumes (both sexes included) spanned ca. 400–
800 cc. The lower end of this range overlaps with the upper
end of the chimpanzee distribution. Thus, the slight australop-
ithecine maternal body mass values would have been associated
with relatively large—and large-brained—neonates. Exhibiting
obligate bipedal anatomy, the small australopithecine/earlyHomo
maternal body would have contributed to high neonate:maternal
body mass ratios (Figure 5). This constitutes additional, albeit
indirect, evidence that alloparenting co-evolved with bipedal
locomotion. The actual maternal costs of carrying an infant
while walking upright were greater than paleoanthropologists
have previously thought. Evolutionary theory predicts that, other
things being equal, early hominin mothers with either more evo-
lutionarily ancestral (i.e., ape-like) or more derived (i.e., like
large-bodied Homo) body mass and locomotor anatomical traits
would have had a reproductive-success advantage in mosaic East
African forest/grassland habitats. Yet, the smaller, more vulner-
able, nutritionally precarious australopithecine maternal bodies
should have faced stiff evolutionary competition. The australo-
pithecine/early Homo pattern—small maternal bodies and high
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FIGURE 5 | Evolutionary change in neonate:maternal body mass ratios in the hominin lineage, compared with extant chimpanzees. Samples are
color-coded as in Figure 4. Fossil hominin samples are shown as estimate ranges. Extant human and chimpanzee sample means shown as×s.
neonate:maternal body mass ratios—contradicts such standard
evolutionary expectations.
This development may be explained by australopithecine
co-evolution with alloparenting behaviors, associated with a
female life-history strategy that gave up adult somatic mass,
in order to maintain caloric and nutrient resource transfers
to offspring during gestation and lactation. Small body size
would have constituted a costly, honest signal that a mother
actually needed assistance in carrying or provisioning offspring
in order to maintain energy balance for herself and for her
infant.
Arguably, then, the question is not whether alloparenting
co-evolved with obligate bipedal locomotion and terrestrial forag-
ing/costly infant-carrying in australopithecines. It is rather: What
was the social structure of alloparenting, particularly in rela-
tion to courtship, mating, and possible cooperative foraging or
food-sharing behaviors (Hrdy, 2009)?
Here, I present a plausible theoretical claim for the following
structure in early australopithecine social systems. Alloparenting
would have fundamentally involved unrelated females—having
transferred at maturity from their natal groups, as observed in
living gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos—engaging in recip-
rocally altruistic assistance during parturition and early chil-
drearing. Continuous honest signaling of maternal and infant
need—in the embodied form of mother’s small size—would
have also favored reduced male aggression and male provision-
ing of offspring. This is because adult males would likely have
faced a time and energy trade-off between provisioning mates
and maintaining and defending a female harem. From this per-
spective alone, it may be argued that bipedal locomotion in
a terrestrial, heterotrophic niche would have favored reduced
male aggression, evidence for which may be seen in the sub-
stantial evolutionary canine-size reduction seen in males and
females alike, from ca. 6–4 mya (Ardipithecus) to ca. 4–1mya
(Australopithecus and early Homo) (Figure 6) (Haile-Selassie and
WoldeGabriel, 2009). In fact, the most effective strategy for
repeatedly obtaining additional calories, in the form of divisi-
ble “public-goods-like” food packages (cf. Hawkes et al., 1998;
O’Connell et al., 1999, 2002; Hawkes, 2003) that could be shared
with mates and (statistically likely) offspring—or at least broth-
ers’ or half-brothers’ offspring—would be for males to cooper-
ate, at least occasionally, in foraging, food transport, and food
sharing.
Thus, three interrelated social behavioral patterns would
have defined the embodied aspects of the obligate bipedal
niche: adult female reciprocal cooperative alloparenting (and—
possibly—midwifery); male cooperative foraging and food trans-
port; and male provisioning of mates (Table 1). This behavioral
nexus would have constituted a dynamic interface between the
body and a socially intense, yet strongly ecologically structured
extrasomatic environment.
The ENC hypothesis supports a key prediction: that long-
term monogamous pair bonding would have also co-evolved
with the bipedal niche, albeit hardly strictly driven by active
male foraging, resource transport, and provisioning of females
(cf. Lovejoy, 1981, 2009; see Table 1). To be sure, from the
adult female’s perspective, the socially intense bipedal inter-
face would have partially structured—and been structured by—
females’ continuous honest signaling to males of precarious
energy balance and risk of predation. Critically, this would
have occurred across three key foci of adult female social
attention:
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• courtship
• soliciting food transfers or physical protection during gestation
and lactation
• continued food transfers, protection, and learning support for
weaned subadult offspring
Yet, the ENC hypothesis predicts that adult males and females
would likely have developed complex pair-bonding relationships
FIGURE 6 | Forensic reconstruction of a male Australopithecus
afarensis adult. The male and female Au. afarensis permanent dentition
exhibits smaller canines than seen in Ardipithecus, suggesting evolution of
honest signaling of reduced fighting ability. Photograph accessed from
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/22/Australopithecus_
afarensis.png.
through recurrent bouts of food transfer solicitation, food trans-
fers, courtship and sex, separating and reuniting, and mutual
monitoring during group travel or nighttime aggregation. This
social interaction and monitoring would have supported higher
cognitive construction of mutually indexical, highly emotional
iconic narratives (see Figure 3) of solicitation and resolution, jeal-
ousy and relief, and (often substantially prolonged) anticipation
and satiation. Semiotic construction of simple mental iconic nar-
ratives would have been recurrently evoked through perceived
embodied experiences. These iconic representations would have
been constructed in part through indexically evoked similari-
ties and contrasts with two other “australopithecine genres” of
iconic narratives: those dealing with reciprocal social assistance—
including midwifery—between adult females and those involving
cooperative foraging and food transport among adult males. In
the context of female-male pair-bonds, these evoked narratives
would have indexically focused the couple’s joint attention on
circumstances at hand that would afford actions—ranging from
traveling together, to mutually caring for offspring, to grooming,
and to sexual intimacy—that would reinforce the pair bond.
THE EMBODIED BIPEDAL TERRESTRIAL NICHE: INFANT
HELPLESSNESS AND DIALECTICAL COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION OF
SELF AND OTHER
Obligate bipedal anatomy seems especially maladaptive for the
australopithecine infant (other things being equal, of course). To
be sure, cooperative social networks would have supported pro-
tecting, transporting, and provisioning infants. And in fact, this
would have more than compensated for the fact that the espe-
cially vulnerable human infant is born with undeveloped, only
potentially supportive anatomy for bipedal locomotion. The evo-
lutionary loss of grasping toes in Australopithecus afarensis (ca.
4–3mya) and later hominins (ca. 3mya and onward), coupled
with the mother’s habitual upright stance, would have rendered
the infant especially dependent on the parent. The infant could
do little—in terms of motor behaviors—to minimize risk of sep-
aration. Thus, accidental separation could result in accidental
abandonment.
Table 1 | Matrix of predicted social interactions among adult males, adult females, and juveniles in Australopithecus afarensis, based on the
embodied niche construction hypothesis.
Column action toward row Derived australopithecine/Homo trait









Adult female Affect hunger displays







Socially extensive cooperative breeding
Adult Male Affect hunger displays
Honest signals of need
Pair-bonding






Cooperation instead of competition over:
➢Food resources
➢Mating opportunities
Fatherhood as emergent trait
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Moreover, the infant’s embodied sensory-motor and visual
interface with the upright bipedal mother entailed new challenges
for learning in early childhood. Bipedal balance and locomo-
tion likely imposed a steeper embodied cognitive learning curve
than would the ancestral quadrupedal walking/grasping/climbing
locomotor pattern. It is simply harder to learn to balance on
two legs while standing upright than it is to balance on four
limbs.
The mother’s bipedal posture and gait also combined with
her infant’s very limited ability to grasp. This would have
prevented the infant from habitually orienting its body in
parallel to the mother, while lying on top of the mother’s
back. In apes and monkeys, the highly effective and sensorily
rich activity of grasping onto mother’s back synergistically
allows the infant to feel the oscillatory rhythm of walking
on all fours, while also resembling quadrupedal grasping dur-
ing arboreal climbing. In australopithecines and early Homo,
in contrast, the earliest experience of being carried during
travel and foraging would have been deictically lateralized.
Consequently, the obligate bipedal infant would have had a rel-
atively distorted embodied experience of the rhythms of habitual
locomotion.
The embodied narrative of exerting agency
Whereas riding on mother’s back incrementally prepares the
non-human primate infant to separate from the mother and
actively explore, the human infant has a very different embod-
ied learning experience. During the first months of life, the
human infant registers and learns about the world through
visual, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory inputs. Yet, gross
motor balance and fine haptic inputs—which provide short-
term, continuous feedback during active embodied learning in
non-human primate infants—would have been severely lim-
ited for australopithecine and early Homo neonates. Thus, the
initial period of hominin learning is frequently shaped by a
passive embodied interface with the extrasomatic environment.
Gross motor strength and balance gradually develop—through
learning to lift up the head, roll, sit, crawl, stand, and walk.
For the human infant, this embodied learning occurs in extra-
somatic environments defined by a protective, usually taken-
for-granted adult social network. Still, as I have underscored
above, the infant cannot efficiently use embodied memory of
earlier experience of being carried by an adult, as she begins
independent gross motor learning. This early learning experi-
ence, then, can canalize construction of a heroic iconic narra-
tive of exerting agency and achieving greater control over the
environment.
The embodied narrative of forming judgments
Moreover, this iconic narrative would be indexically linked to
another, contrasting early-life iconic narrative, in which the infant
observes the extrasomatic environment over extended bouts, per-
haps as long as an hour, at a distance. The infant is alert but
passively secure, able to focus on objects and events around her.
This iconic narrative would be one in which passive monitoring
results in changing affect. The infant can look, hear, smell, taste,
and judge.
Overview of iconic narratives in the obligate bipedal niche:
ideology and praxis
The two main learned iconic narratives of the first months of life
are then speculated to be those of exerting agency, on the one
hand, and of judging the situation, on the other. I argue that the
obligate bipedal niche itself would have encouraged the embod-
ied learning of reflexive alertness in the first months of life, even
prior to natural selection for derived higher cognitive phenotypic
functions.
When the hominin juvenile has attained sufficient motor
strength and balance to begin interacting with a wider envi-
ronment over longer intervals, she experiences a major contrast
between the more passive infant interface and the new, highly
exciting but difficult juvenile one. The young juvenile’s embodied
capital now affords it the agency to seek out and integrate hap-
tic and motor information with other sensory inputs. Here, new
iconic narratives become indexically linked to the early-life narra-
tive of agency, in turn, contrasting with the early-life narrative of
affective judgment. This may be seen as the ontogeny of an indi-
vidual dialectic between ideology—the semiotically constituted,
narrativized representations of how one hopes or would like the
world to be—and praxis—that is, what one does, or does not do,
to actualize that ideology.
OVERVIEW OF EMBODIED NICHE CONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE
BIPEDAL INTERFACE
The bipedal niche would have minimally supported embodied
pro-social bonding between juveniles and their maternal relatives,
between adult females, and between adult males (see Table 1).
The ENC hypothesis deepens existing ecological explanations
of how obligate bipedalism evolved. This phenotypic system is
traditionally seen strictly as adaptive to a primarily terrestrial
heterotrophic niche in East and north Central African, initially
among australopithecine populations, ca. 4–3mya. The dynamic
co-evolutionarymodel of reciprocal causation in niche and popu-
lation change—based on niche construction theory—illuminates
the possibility that obligate bipedalism as an embodied niche
ontogenetically structured a semiotic interface with the extraso-
matic environment. This interface mediated sustained embodied
attention on prevailing social and material situations, through
constructed, indexically interrelated iconic narratives.
The ENC hypothesis predicts that sustained introspective
attention and more hierarchically complex semiotic systems co-
evolved with bipedalism. Both semiotically structured cogni-
tion and bipedal locomotion were phenotypic adaptations and
embodied niche interfaces. The complex niche-population co-
evolutionary dynamic resulted in overall population fit to a much
more open, yet dangerous terrain, but supported by a rich and
diverse range of heterotrophic food resources. Thus, the ENC
hypothesis further predicts selection for aggregating in large
groups to avoid predation—especially from evening until morn-
ing. It also predicts alloparenting by older juvenile and adult
female maternal allies, adult female mutual assistance during
childbirth, and group fissioning during diurnal, omnivorous, and
nonetheless gregarious—if not outright altruistic or synchronized
cooperative—foraging, followed by occasional food transport and
group fusion. The semiotic component of the embodied bipedal
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niche is also predicted to have favored the evolution of more
complex symbolic thought, which would have sustained the indi-
vidual’s attention on multi-step longer-term (at least hour-scale)
planning, delaying gratification, and making social judgments in
guiding solicitation of help, offers of assistance, and mobilization
of cooperative activities.
DISCUSSION
The hominin (human) and panin (chimpanzee and bonobo) lin-
eages mutually evolved a reproductive barrier during the late
Miocene period, ca. 7–5mya, in Subsaharan Africa. The foodweb
and habitat features that distinguished hominin niche construc-
tion from that of the panins included a spatially more extensive
terrestrial setting and a broader heterotrophic prey spectrum.
The case study on early australopithecine obligate bipedalism, ca.
4–3mya, supports the argument that hominin niche construction
further differed from that of the panins, increasingly involving
semiotically structured cognition in the embodied bipedal inter-
face. This interface facilitated adaptive behavior in an intensely
social and complex material habitat.
According to the most recent paleoanthropological research,
the final Pliocene and early Pleistocene periods—roughly 2.5–
0.8mya—encompassed even more dynamic co-evolutionary
change in the embodied niche. The oldest known stone tools were
used early in this time frame, with the emergence of the genus
Homo following soon afterward (Kimbel et al., 1997; Semaw et al.,
1997; Semaw, 2000; Domínguez-Rodrigo et al., 2005; Stout et al.,
2005; Goldman-Neuman and Hovers, 2009; Kimbel, 2009). We
can infer further change in the bipedal interface, which exhibits
interrelated modifications in balance, static upper-limb loading,
visual, and auditory components. Changes in the anatomy of the
hand and thumb supported precision grip in early Homo. This
adaptive modification would have been integral to making and
using small stone tools with the thumb and other manual dig-
its (Marzke, 1997; Marzke and Marzke, 2000). The resulting joint
visual and fine manual interface would have structured bouts of
goal-oriented, highly visually focused interaction with the mate-
rial environment (Stout et al., 2008; Stout, 2011), suppressing
embodied attention toward social or wider environmental infor-
mation. Such sustained goal-oriented embodied attention would
have contrasted with embodied experiences during which par-
tially decentralized cognition supported locomotion or rhythmic,
repetitive tool-making or use, while also maintaining atten-
tion on surrounding social events, facilitating social judgment.
ENC thus favored temporally alternating interfaces involving
social alertness suppression and very context-sensitive social
hyper-alertness.
Hominin ENC was especially shaped by those behavioral
traits—including bipedal locomotion, tool-making, resource
transport, food processing and social food consumption (involv-
ing non-agonistic interactions during feeding, as well as active
sharing)—whose long-term evolution already had come to define
a distinctive adaptation-niche coevolutionary trajectory. These
key behavioral phenotypes, whose evolution was well underway
by the Middle Pleistocene period (ca. 780-130 thousand years ago
[kya]), were also components of the hominin niche. The Middle
Pleistocene timeframe is important as we begin to consider how
the ENC hypothesis might inform speculation, hypothesis forma-
tion, and research methods concerning the evolution of human
language. Toward the end of the Middle Pleistocene, extant abso-
lute brain volumes emerged in Subsaharan African anatomically
modern humans (AMH) and western Eurasian Neandertals (ca.
200–130mya) (Lee and Wolpoff, 2003). In addition, extant body
proportions—including encephalization quotients—appeared in
early AMH populations, after ca. 200 kya (Ruff et al., 1997).
The embodied niche complex that co-evolved with the australo-
pithecines and early genus Homo, then, was not dependent on
a modern-sized brain or brain-body proportions. Evidence on
skeletal growth rates and aging in fossil remains from the entirety
of the Pleistocene era (ca. 1.80–0.01mya) further suggests that
initial adaptation to the earlyHomo embodied niche complex was
not dependent on modern patterns of slow, delayed maturation
and significant post-reproductive survival (Caspari and Lee, 2004,
2006; Smith et al., 2007a,b).
Here, the ENC hypothesis can elegantly explain the fur-
ther coevolution of embodied niche with a hypothetical
proto-language capacity (cf. Tomasello, 2008). The embodied
dimension of the emergent hominin niche would have favored
long-term selection for formally simple—and likely declarative
but implicitly deictic—gestures or utterances that constituted
symbolic representations. Such utterances would have been expe-
rienced as embodied sensory-motor concepts, whether they were
initially verbal or brachial-manual gestures. Already defined by
a complex web of visual, auditory, and motor-simulation asso-
ciations that comprised a socially learned proto-language, the
earliest verbal symbols would have further pointed to states of
affairs in the environment, indexically tying together somatic and
extrasomatic aspects of the prevailing milieu (Gallese and Lakoff,
2005; Tomasello, 2008). In turn, this would have synergistically
reinforced learning complex foraging behaviors and social com-
petence in networks sustained by strong reciprocity/reputation
monitoring (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund,
2005). Linguistic communication would have shared a funda-
mental structural and functional similarity with omnivorous
foraging, tool-making, and social cooperation (Stout et al.,
2008). These embodied cognition/environment interfaces basi-
cally involve sustained attention on representation-dependent,
goal-directed activity sequences, which may unfold over min-
utes or hours—with further potential for resuming attention
on representation-dependent activities after intermittent breaks.
Such embodied cognitive attention is hypothesized to reduce
immediate sensory alertness levels, because the higher-level cog-
nitive processes go beyond sensoro-motor cognitive simulation,
involving more complex abstract narrative construction.
In light of the paleoanthropological evidence, the ENC
hypothesis entails two mutually exclusive—but nonetheless
plausible—evolutionary trajectories:
• Linguistic utterance and comprehension co-evolved gradually
with the genus Homo’s embodied niche—following the estab-
lishment of the bipedal interface and the subsequent emergence
of the manual precision/tool-making/tool-using interface—
beginning as early as 3.0–2.0mya (Schepartz, 1993; Deacon,
1998; Lieberman, 2013); or
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• Spoken language rapidly evolved more recently (Chomsky,
1986), preceded by a long period of evolution in mental nar-
rative construction and selective introspective attention—only
later co-evolving with extant biological life history patterns of
growth, maturation, aging and mortality (cf. Caspari and Lee,
2004, 2006; Smith et al., 2007a; Smith, 2013).
In either case, the evolutionarily derived hominin capacity for
narrativizing simple iconic or symbolic semiotic representations
would have evolved through by natural selection during the
Pleistocene era. As argued throughout this hypothesis and theory
article, it is predicted that the capacity to construct—and even
recursively share representations of—embodied, iconically and
symbolically represented narratives would have emerged via the
dynamic bipedal and social monitoring/judgment interfaces that
centrally define our terrestrial, extractive, and socially intensive
extrasomatic environment.
NARRATIVE REPRESENTATION AS EMBODIED TEMPORALITY
Theoretical approaches to human and non-human animal learn-
ing and behavior still strongly emphasize synchronic embod-
ied representation or near-instantaneous cognitive feedback.
Philosophers of cognition, experimental psychologists, and brain
imaging experts have convincingly explained that embod-
ied simulation connects affective and proprioceptive states or
motor memories to extrasomatic stimuli (Barsalou, 1999, 2009;
Damasio et al., 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Heyes, 2010a,b;
Dove, 2011; Man et al., 2012). Moreover, recurrent memory
construction surely often shapes perceived extrasomatic phenom-
ena or body-environment relationships, which specifically have a
synchronic or short-term antecedent-consequent structure. Such
embodied perceptual concepts may range from learning relevant,
albeit complex figure-ground contrasts to more comprehensive,
amodal learning of predator threat concepts or subtle indices of
prey availability. Mapped onto Deacon’s (1998) semiotic frame-
work, such embodied concepts develop through bodily interfaces
with the surrounding environment—specifically as stable indexi-
cal relationship systems. Cognized objects or bodily states imme-
diately point to—or are pointed to by—other objects or somatic
states.
If I am right that the embodied, private iconic narrative con-
stitutes a key adaptive phenotype/embodied niche component
in hominin evolution, then it would be especially important
to consider the narrativized temporality of such indexical rela-
tionship systems. Quite different perspectives in recent human
cognition scholarship have converged on highlighting embod-
ied narratives and cognitive sensitivity to temporal duration
and degrees of pastness (Hutto, 2008; Menary, 2008; Gallese,
2011; Panksepp and Biven, 2012). So far, I have emphasized two
embodied iconic, non-linguistic narrative genres as important
for the ENC hypothesis (for details, see section The Embodied
Bipedal Terrestrial Niche: Infant Helplessness and Dialectical
Cognitive Construction of Self and Other). The first is the exer-
tion of agency, which is a narrative of self having—or failing
to have—an effect on someone or something. The second is
the achievement of judgment, in which self achieves—or fails
to achieve—an unambiguous affective disposition concerning
someone or something else that she has been regarding in the
extrasomatic environment. Such simple metacognitive narratives
would have a scale-free, relative temporality: before, the situa-
tion was ambiguous or uncertain, but now, self has achieved a
clear outcome. The relative chronological structure of these gen-
res would reflect the most basic, temporally marked indexical
relationship. On the one hand, a representation of the ear-
lier, ambiguous past can point toward memory of reaching a
clear outcome in the relatively more recent past. On the other
hand, a prior representation of the remembered or imagined,
more recent clear outcome could evoke the entire (possibly
tragic, possibly triumphant) narrative arc, from earlier ambigu-
ity to subsequent clarity. The very general, scale-free structure of
the agency and judgment narratives has a series of remarkable
implications:
➢ Iconic narrative representations may initially evoke the gen-
eral, familiar feeling of attention on self ’s body-environment
interaction, as it unfolds over short timescales, from fractions
of a second to hours. Yet, they may recursively evoke a chain of
chronologically ordered, nested, or longer continuous stories
of agency or judgment. As such, the iconic narrative comprises
the formal semiotic building block for representing diverse,
complex pasts.
➢ The generic, elemental narrative form efficiently contextu-
alizes and emphasizes diachronic changes in self ’s affective
emotional states. As such, self ’s selective introspective or
mindful attention on narrativized memories can autocon-
dition complex learning. This may be especially important
for developing competence at intricate, temporally extended,
choppy, and contingent behavior sequences in the hominin
terrestrial, extractive, heterotrophic, and intensely social
niche.
➢ Simple iconic social judgment narratives have a particularly
strong general conditioning effect on building complex sta-
ble indexical relationship systems. When self learns embodied
understanding of a social other, her embodied cognitive con-
struction process sets up a hierarchically constituted triadic
association—one that is very familiar to structural anthro-
pology, in which two terms are equated or opposed, and in
turn, that dyadic relationship is metonymically indexed to
a third, generally evocative term (Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Leach,
1976). Here, the socially interacting or regarding agent per-
ceives that the other is either similar or dissimilar to herself,
in some markedly evocative respect. Her embodied expe-
rience provides rich synchronic information, involving her
own perceptions of the grounding environment in which the
other is defined; her prevailing proprioceptive or interocep-
tive states; and memory content evoked by the situation at
hand. This embodied information is material for reinforc-
ing or metonymically tagging the experience that other is—or
is not—like self. As an embodied concept that integrates
perception of other with evoked, sensory-motor/emotional
simulated experience, the understood relationship between
self and other has its own rich potential to evoke—that is,
to approach synchronic juxtaposition with—learned concepts
that have similar experiential tags or indices.
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➢ The auto-indexical connection between the narratives and
the emotional changes embedded in them further recursively
rewards introspection and the mental consideration of plau-
sible and implausible associations, alike, so that narrativized
embodied representations mediate changes in self ’s affective
states over time.
In general, through recursive iconic narrative construction,
embodied cognition can “pancake” or elide diachronic features of
the narrative’s content, yielding new synchronically represented
associations among action sequences, changes in the extrasomatic
environment, and changes in bodily affective states (Table 2).
ICONIC NARRATIVES AS EVOLUTIONARY PRECURSORS TO
SOCIO-LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTIONS
The theoretically plausible—albeit preliminary and speculative—
argument for the ENC hypothesis, presented above, also implies
the following. As joint adaptive phenotype and embodied niche
component, recursive iconic narrative construction was evolu-
tionarily ancestral to natural open language systems, with their
fundamental feature of “double articulation.” Logically consis-
tent patterns governing the orderly juxtaposition (that is, the
articulation) of message features require that similar, substi-
tutable elements—on the dual, nested levels of phonological
regularities and syntactical structures—are available (Jakobson
and Halle, 1956; Hockett, 1961; Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Saussure,
2011). Double articulation is an apparent formal and functional
necessity for natural languages. More generally, though, inter-
action between message-feature contiguity and similarity makes
double articulation possible (Jakobson and Halle, 1956; Lévi-
Strauss, 1962a). The recursive interplay between contiguity and
similarity is, in turn, sufficient to generate the openness of
natural language, in which a finite set of signs may be com-
bined, repeated, and substituted to generate potentially infinite
expressions or representations (Chomsky, 1986; Hauser et al.,
2002). Thus, contiguity-similarity interaction can structure and
be structured by hierarchically nested message elements, in which
Table 2 | Matrix of hypothetical emotional and affective trajectories of the two main proposed genres of embodied iconic narratives emerging
in human evolution.
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one or more element-levels incorporate coherent, independent
messages. In other words, double articulation at the phoneme and
lexico-grammatical levels may be understood as an instance of
our more general capacity for embodied cognitive recursion—a
capacity that emerged gradually in hominin evolution, beginning
well prior to language evolution itself.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
TESTING THE ENC HYPOTHESIS
The ENC hypothesis has particular potential to connect general
anthropological (including ethnographic), paleoanthropological,
cognitive science, and comparative experimental psychological
approaches to human cognition and embodied experience. My
aim in this article has been to outline the ENC hypothesis in
some detail and attempt to establish its relevance for explain-
ing the evolution of human cognition over very long timeframes.
This simply reflects my paleoanthropological research specializa-
tion. However, my hope is that the ENC hypothesis can guide
collaboration among anthropologists, cognitive scientists, and
experimental psychologists, redefining and expanding theories,
evolutionary perspectives, and observational and experimental
designs. We should be able to evaluate whether the ENC hypoth-
esis provides a more reliable, comprehensive explanation of how
abstract or “dis-embodied” concepts (Dove, 2011)—as dynamic
features of our semiotically structured worlds—might arise from,
yet remain grounded in indexical associations with embodied
sensory-motor representations and iconic memories. Perhaps the
most concrete, testable prediction of the ENC hypothesis is that
structured measurable changes in affect, emotional state, and
sensory attentiveness should occur over brief time periods, as
subjects experience and focus their introspective attention on
embodied iconic narrative representations (see Table 2). More
broadly, we should be able to measure how culturally contextu-
alized narratives and relationships, rituals, learning tasks, skilled
artistic or craft production, and responses to scenarios involv-
ing culturally relevant power structures influence neural activity,
vital rates, pupil dilation, and hormone levels within and between
study groups defined by biological life history stages and cultur-
ally relevant identities.
CONCLUSION
If the embodied cognition theoretical framework explains behav-
ioral, central nervous system, and conceptual or representational
phenomena better than strictly computational brain models—
and certainly better than “disembodied” theories of mind (as
argued by Clark, 2008 and Dove, 2011)—then paleoanthropo-
logical inquiry would benefit from embodied cognition research.
Such interdisciplinary borrowing would facilitate investigating
how unique-derived hominin brain anatomy and behavior pat-
terns evolved, potentially helping to demystify the prehistoric
emergence of language, symbolic representation, and the con-
scious human mind (Barton, 2012). In this article I have argued
that ENC in the hominin lineage has involved a distinctive,
semiotically structured and structuring interface between the
body and the extrasomatic environment. This interface is consti-
tuted by narratives that are at once embodied and semiotically
constructed, at once cognitive adaptations and embodied niche
components. As we expand our perspective to view embodied
cognition and interaction with the environment as both phe-
notype and niche, the ENC hypothesis can help to clarify the
long-term evolutionary process through which human biology,
semiotically structured worlds, and embodied experiences have
emerged.
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